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Earlier this year, Naomi Hossain drew on her latest book The Aid Lab to discuss Bangladesh’s
development at the South Asia Centre. Before the session, Sonali Campion interviewed her about
how crises before and after independence may have paved the way for development success, and
the lessons other countries can take from Bangladesh.
SC: Your new book ‘The Aid Lab’ explores the Bangladesh paradox of poor
governance, high corruption, and rapid social progress. One of the things you
look at is how the crises in the 1970s actually laid the foundation for the development
successes. Tell me more about this.
NH: There were a series of crises in the early 1970s, starting with the Bhola cyclone in 1970. People have largely
forgotten about it, but most political scientists agree that it was the trigger for independence. It was one of the most
destructive cyclones ever (even if you take into account the 2004 tsunami), something like half a million people were
killed. Bangladesh was still East Pakistan at the time, and the Pakistan government didn’t do much about it. They
showed that they didn’t really care – and then there were elections 3 weeks later. These were Pakistan’s first proper
democratic elections and the East Pakistan Awami League headed by Sheikh Mujibur won a landslide. They weren’t
allowed to form a government, which led to the war.
As a result the new government in independent Bangladesh had to be responsive to natural disaster, because it was
part of their mandate. When the famine struck in 1974 it was unusual famine because it wasn’t that the government
didn’t want to respond. They knew it was important for their survival, partly because of the Bhola cyclone but also
because the Bangladeshi people were always facing these kinds of crisis. We had the famine of 1943-44, the
Churchill famine as we think of it now, so it was not a new problem.
Around 1.5million people died in 1974. As with all famines there were multiple causes but ultimately, the government
was blamed for not acting. After the famine there was a massive political crisis and Sheikh Mujibur and his family
were killed. It became an existential crisis for the elite itself, which realised that their own survival depended on
tackling these issues. So I think a tacit social contract emerges out of these disasters and the political crises that
followed. This was an unusual contract because it brought together the political elites, and the population as a whole
but also the aid donors.
Do you think that elites were motivated by a desire to show better governance in the face of
natural disaster than West Pakistan?
They had to show they were not like the Pakistani rulers, they had to show these are our people, we care about
them and so on. But there’s also something particular about the Bangladeshi elite – although this has changed
somewhat now. In those days it was distinctive because it was very similar to the masses. There’s a real affinity
between rural population and the ruling classes: they’re all Bengali Muslims, they speak the same language, and
they have similar backgrounds. Some people have said, “You can’t call these people ‘elite’, they were the rural
middle classes with a bit of upward mobility”, i.e. they were in social terms very close to the population.
This has an impact on how they feel about the population. Ethiopia had a famine at exactly the same time, but the
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ruler sitting in Addis Ababa is King and God in perpetuity. The people who are starving are to him different people far
away. It’s a totally different political scenario.
Was it ever fair to call Bangladesh a basket case?
It was never fair but it was moderately appropriate at that moment in 1970s when Henry Kissinger famously used
the term. Nobody had really focussed on this part of the world properly before, it had always been bundled together
with Pakistan and India, and there was a high concentration of poverty, deprivation and disasters. The CIA in fact
wrote a report in which they were almost agog; they couldn’t believe that so many poor people could live in such
bad circumstances in such a small landmass.
The basket case label has dogged Bangladesh, even now politicians talk about it, there’s a whole big agenda
around ridding ourselves of this. However, it was problematic because it didn’t take into account the political reasons
why this area was in this condition, whether it was the repression, extraction, and indebtedness which had come
with colonialism, or the continued extraction under neo-colonial rule following independence. So it was kind of
accurate, but there was little attempt to understand why.
The book uses Bangladesh as a case study but it tries to draw out lessons for other
developing countries. What are the recommendations?
Bangladesh is a useful example in at least two respects. One is in terms of vulnerability to climate change.
Bangladesh has been feeling the effects of climate change for a century according to some estimates. Now others
are experiencing climate change-related disasters, you see this wave of famines in the Middle East and around the
Horn of Africa, in widespread drought and so on. We should learn lessons about institutionalising protection against
disasters. It’s not perfect in Bangladesh but they’ve done well there because it’s a priority that is above politics.
Climate change adaptation: ‘Portable houses’ on stilts in Mawa, Bangladesh are specially designed so that they
can be moved quickly in the event of a storm. Credit: BBC World Service Bangladesh CC BY-NC 2.0
Bangladesh also moved into global markets very early on, much earlier than other low or lower middle income
countries, if only because we had nothing else to sell but our labour. It’s difficult to navigate a position in the global
system but Bangladesh seems to have found a balance that works in terms of labour markets, exports, and climate
change priorities. Interestingly, these are two areas in which we see Bangladeshis taking a real lead on the world
stage, whether it is at the Paris Climate negotiations, or WTO negotiations. These also recently become more vocal
on labour migration and migrant rights issues.
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How does this work intersect with your research on access to food and mobilisation around
hunger?
There’s a lot of discussion around the right to food now, especially in the wake of the 2008 global food crisis. The
Bangladesh case is relevant because it shows that this social contract that is the bedrock of any kind of economic
and social development policy. Not everywhere has great food insecurity, but those places that do would do well to
think about how this right to food is institutionalised. That’s an important area of intersection.
I was doing a piece of work on food riots and food rights after the global food crisis, which is really what got me
thinking about the famine in Bangladesh and this book. I was working with a colleague of mine on a comparative
study of different countries. Bangladesh had a pretty strong response to the 2008 global food price spike, even
though it was a difficult time for them – they had an interim government, India had closed its borders and wasn’t
selling rice, but they managed to pull it out of the hat. We were asking all these policymakers and scholars, “Why did
Bangladesh, compared to Kenya or Mozambique or even India, have such a good response?” They would look at us
blankly as if we were stupid and then they would say, “Because of the famine”.
People don’t talk about the famine. They talk about ’43 but they don’t talk about ’74. I thought there was something
interesting in that silence that I wanted to understand. My sense is that there is a lingering middle class elite guilt
about the 1974 famine. It’s very interesting to think about how the centuries-long struggles over food in Europe and
the relationships between states and markets and citizens where resolved in more integrated food markets, more
responsive states and so on. In Bangladesh I think they were forced to get there a bit earlier. If you don’t have food
security what development can you have?
You’re beginning to touch on governance. In the Bangladesh Paradox idea, the government is
often just written off. What are the prospects for the having an impact on the NGO success
we have seen (good or bad)?
Bangladesh is one of the examples that might suggest you don’t need liberal democracy to have development. On
the other hand, most of the progress, particularly around human development, happened in the more competitive
multiple party period from 1991 onwards. There’s clearly a sense in which proper political competition, free civil
society, a vibrant media and so on has made a difference.
That said, some difficult development decisions, particularly around things such as infrastructure are hard to take
when you have short time horizons in the rural elite. It’s hard to build major bridges or big road systems when you
think you’re going to get turfed out in 5 years time, particularly when large payments are needed to make them
happen, which we understand is still pretty standard in Bangladesh.
The closing of the political space now is interesting because there is great potential risk, but development on all
sorts of fronts has actually been proceeding very nicely in the last 5 or so years – you have high rates of growth, a
lot of investment in human development and so on. Having a dominant party is not bad necessarily for most kinds of
development. I think this is the Rawanda story too.
But Bangladesh is a very different society, it’s very fractious and competitive, people do resent the closing of the
political space. Some say it is directly related to the rise of extremism and that’s been a bit of a shock in
Bangladesh. I think that might be true but I don’t know. What is worrying is the closure of the space for civil society
and the media could have a real impact on the government’s transparency and responsiveness. So for instance if
we were to have a major food crisis somewhere remote now, it’s not entirely clear to me that the media would free to
report it, and that the government would feel pressured to respond. It’s something we have to watch.
A second specific concern is the unreliability of statistics under closed systems. You can’t really have a successful
development model if you’re not tracking and monitoring. It’s a matter of accountability.
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Listen to the podcast from Dr Hossain’s talk Out of the basket: Lessons from Bangladesh’s development successes
here.
This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the South Asia @ LSE blog, nor of the London
School of Economics. Please read ourcomments policy before posting.
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